
Even strict authentication mode has a hole, we're told, while basic exploit defenses are missing from the firmware
A Dutch cybersecurity researcher claims he found six zero-days in Danfoss refrigeration controller firmware in under an hour, then delivered a withering assessment of the vendor's defenses against memory corruption.
The Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium (CCB) warns that the flaws could let attackers take control without credentials, potentially retain access after resets, or disable controllers altogether.
Carlo Meijer of cyber consultancy Midnight Blue examined the latest AK-SM800A firmware, version 5.3.2, manually – no AI required.
He said that he went looking in random places where strcpy() is invoked, given the vendor's "extremely liberal use" of the function (which doesn't check whether the destination buffer is large enough), and swiftly found five cases in which he said he could trigger a segfault with a one-line cURL command.
"Of course, remotely triggering a crash is bad in itself, but being able to leverage the buffer overflow to obtain remote code execution is much worse," he wrote.
Meijer added: "Any reasonably experienced exploit developer will agree exploiting straightforward stack-based buffer overflows on ARM Linux without exploit mitigations is very straightforward. And if they don't, there's probably a frontier or open-weight model out there willing to help them agree."
He noted that before achieving RCE, an attacker would need to overcome the limitation of strcpy() where it stops copying bytes after hitting a null byte, but said "it's not exactly rocket surgery."
He went on to claim: "Also, the exploited application runs as root (because of course it does)."
Later firmware adds "session control," an authentication mechanism whose strict setting blocks unauthenticated access to most web interfaces. But Meijer found a memory corruption flaw in that protective layer too.
He described the final zero-day as a "trivial" pre-auth memory corruption bug which again starts with a segfault but can be wangled into an RCE "with some additional effort."
Meijer also considered whether attackers could maintain access after a reset, as seen with implants such as Saltwater and Firestarter. He considered this feasible because the controllers do not use their processor's secure boot features.
"In such a scenario, an attacker could either retain remote access or leave a time-triggered payload for a 2nd (or 3rd...) strike – increasing damage by spoiling new batches of food," said Meijer.
"Alternatively, attackers could simply wipe flash memory and/or push a malformed firmware update to brick the controllers and render them permanently inoperable – requiring costly and time-consuming replacement similar to the TTPs deployed during the December 2025 attack on the Polish electric grid."
Meijer's priority for operators was to remove the controllers' direct internet exposure, rather than spend scarce resources on piecemeal patching.
He said the vendor's advice following the attacks on European supermarkets and blood banks in recent weeks – rotating creds, applying patches, enabling strict session control – was insufficient given the flaws in the controllers' codebase.
"This is insufficient and asset owners need to remove internet exposure as soon as possible," said Meijer. "We recommend against allocating scarce security resources to patching efforts and instead focus on reducing exposure."
The CCB likewise urged operators to remove direct internet exposure immediately, but also recommended applying patches when they become available.
Beyond the liberal use of strcpy(), Meijer criticized the absence of standard exploit mitigations, including stack canaries and position-independent executables.
"These mechanisms have been staples of memory corruption defenses for decades and enabling these features... requires no engineering work at all," he said.
"It is simply a matter of setting the right compiler flag. Enabling these features became the default in Ubuntu 17.10 and there is simply no excuse for a network-facing application that was last updated a few months ago to not have them enabled."
asked Danfoss to respond to the findings, but it did not reply.
Danfoss has consistently blanked our requests for information since being implicated in at least some of the attacks that affected European supermarkets recently, alongside rival controller vendors Copeland and Dixell.
It also did not respond when we asked about its involvement in the attacks on US commissary appliances over the summer, after some alleged that its controllers were targeted. ®